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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3406 
_____________ 
 
MARINA LOPEZ-BONILLA; 
 F.F.F.-L. (MINOR CHILD), 
       Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A208-380-773 
Agency No. A208-380-774) 
  Immigration Judge: John B. Carle 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2018 
  
Before:  McKEE and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.* 
 
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2019) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION** 
                                              
* The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie a member of the merits panel retired from the Court 
on January 1, 2019 after the submission date, but before the filing of the opinion.  This 
opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit 
I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
_________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Marina Lopez-Bonilla and F.F.F.-L. (her minor child), natives of Honduras, 
petition for review of a final order of removal entered against them by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.  The BIA adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision 
denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition for 
review.1        
I. 
  To be granted asylum, one must prove that s/he is a “refugee” as defined in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.  A refugee is there defined as one who: (1) is being 
persecuted based on their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion;” and (2) can establish past persecution or a well-founded fear 
of future persecution if returned to their country of nationality.2  The applicant bears the 
burden of proof in establishing refugee status. 
 Petitioners sought to establish persecution on the basis of their membership in the 
Fredys Lopez-Hernandez family.  The IJ agreed that, for the purposes of refugee status, 
                                              
1 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  We have jurisdiction under  
8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Our standard of review of the BIA’s legal conclusions is de novo. 
Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because the BIA adopted the 
findings of the IJ and made additional findings, we will review the decisions of both the 
BIA and the IJ. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Wang v. 
Ashcroft, 368 F. 3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
2 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). 
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the “nuclear family of Fredys Lopez-Hernandez” qualifies as a particular social group. 
But, the IJ correctly concluded that Petitioners did not qualify for asylum because they 
failed to establish that a nexus between the social group and the alleged persecution.  The 
IJ determined that the alleged persecution was nothing more than generalized criminality 
and violence.   
 In addition, none of the threats the Petitioners received resulted in physical harm. 
Although a threat may constitute persecution, we have “refused to extend asylum 
protection for threats that, while sinister and credible in nature, were not highly imminent 
or concrete or failed to result in any physical violence or harm.”3  Consequently, these 
threats failed to rise to the level of persecution.  
 
II. 
 For the same reasons that Petitioners’ proof failed to establish an asylum claim, it 
also failed to support a claim that they qualify for withholding of removal.  Substantial 
evidence supports the IJ’s finding that the Petitioners failed to meet the burden for 
withholding of removal.  As discussed above, the testimony of the Petitioners undermines 
their claims of persecution and refugee status.  
III. 
 Finally, Petitioners have failed to make a credible claim for relief under the CAT.  
Petitioners alleged persecutors were not government agents nor persons the government 
                                              
3 Chavarrie v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Li. V. Att’y Gen., 400 
F3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) 
 
 
4 
was unwilling or unable to control.  Petitioners’ own testimony established that they were 
threatened to discourage them from reporting information concerning the Fredys Lopez-
Hernandez murder to law enforcement.  That evidence not only failed to establish 
government involvement or acquiescence, it showed exactly the opposite.  The purported 
perpetrators were concerned that the government would enforce the law and punish them 
for their criminal conduct. As we have just noted, the fact that the threats were intended 
to dissuade them from reporting criminal activity to the government undermines the 
required proof that they will be tortured by the Honduran government or by persons 
whom that government is unwilling, or unable to control.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the Petition for Review.  
 
 
 
 
 
